by Joshua Wu Kai-Ming | Apr 13, 2022 | Law
1. Provided for under Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957
Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 (“DA 1957”) provides the following:
“In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.”
2. A complete defence to a defamation action
In Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee  6 MLJ 187, the Federal Court opined:
“As a matter of general rule, the defence of justification is a complete defence to a defamation action (see Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor  1 MLJ 75 and Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya’akub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors  1 MLJ 393).”
This legal proposition was affirmed by the Federal Court in Noor Azman bin Azemi v Zahida bt Mohamed Rafik  3 MLJ 141.
3. The burden lies on the defendant to establish the defence
Tun Salleh Abbas FJ in International Times v Leong Ho Yuen  2 MLJ 86 remarked that:
“The appellants in the present appeal relied on justification and fair comment. Therefore, the burden of proving these defences rests entirely upon them (Gatley on Libel and Slander 7th Edition paras. 351 and 354).”
This has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim  2 MLJ 173, and the Federal Court in, amongst others, Noor Azman bin Azemi v Zahida bt Mohamed Rafik  3 MLJ 141 and Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee  6 MLJ 187.
4. The Defendant must state clearly and explicitly the meanings which he/she seeks to justify
The Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee  6 MLJ 187 summarised the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Lucas-Box v Associated Newspapers Group Plc & Ors  1 All ER 177:
“In substance, the Lucas-Box plea of justification as decided by the English Court of Appeal is as follows:
(a) if a plaintiff, in its defamation pleadings, gives a natural and ordinary meaning to the impugned words, the defendant may then rely on stating in his defence what he alleged was the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of; and
(b) a defendant in defamation proceedings who wishes to rely on a plea of justification must make clear in the particulars of justification the case which he is seeking to set up and must accordingly state clearly and explicitly the meaning which he seeks to justify.” (Emphasis ours)
In Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor  2 MLJ 577, the Federal Court referred to Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th Ed) and similarly held that:
“Where a claimant complains that words are defamatory of him in their natural and ordinary meaning, the defendant is entitled to justify those words in any meaning which those words are capable of conveying to a reasonable man (see Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th Ed) para 27.8 citing Prager v Times Newspapers Ltd  1 WLR 77.” (Emphasis ours)
5. The defamatory allegations made must be substantially true
In interpreting Section 8 of the DA 1957, the Federal Court in Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor  2 MLJ 577 was of the view:
“… there only needs to be substantial justification of the whole libel and it is not necessary to prove the truth of every word of the libel.” (Emphasis ours)
Azahar Mohamed FCJ, in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee  6 MLJ 187, held:
“A defendant will have sufficiently proven the defence of justification if he is able to prove the truth or the substantial truth of his own meanings of the impugned words (see Moore v News of the World Ltd and another  1 All ER 915 and Khalid Yusoff v Pertubuhan Berita Nasional Malaysia (Bernama) & Ors  8 CLJ 337, Cheah Cheng Hoc & Ors v Liew Yew Tiam & Ors  6 MLJ 204).” (Emphasis ours)
by Joshua Wu Kai-Ming | Sep 28, 2021 | Law
Malaysian defamation law has received significant judicial deliberation by the apex court over the past few years.
This includes determinations on whether governments, government/public officials, and political parties are able to bring and maintain defamation suits.
In Chong Chieng Jen v Government of State of Sarawak & Anor  3 MLJ 300 (“Chong Chieng Jen“), the Federal Court unanimously upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision and held:
“The right of the government including the State Government of Sarawak to sue including to sue for defamation is statutorily provided under s 3 of [the Government Proceedings Act 1956]. Hence, the English common law principle expounded in Derbyshire does not apply.”
After the decision, the Appellant filed for a review of the Federal Court’s decision pursuant to Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995.
The Appellant was, unfortunately, unsuccessful as another panel of the Federal Court unanimously dismissed the Appellant’s application for review.
The legal position, at the present moment, is that governments can initiate and maintain defamation suits.
In Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim [Federal Court Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-61-07/2019(W)] which was heard together with Lim Guan Eng v Dato’ Ibrahim Ali & Anor [Federal Court Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-61-07/2019(W)] (collectively referred to as ” “), the Federal Court had the following leave question for its determination:
“Does the decision of the Federal Court in Chong Chieng Jen v The State Government of Sarawak  1 CLJ 329 allow a Government Official to sue for defamation in his or her official capacity bearing in mind the decision in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspaper Ltd & Ors  1 All ER 1011, not being applicable under Malaysian law?”
In Chong Chieng Jen v The State Government of Sarawak  1 CLJ 329, the Federal Court unanimously held that:
i. pursuant to Section 3 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956, Government’s could sue including for defamation; and
ii. the principle in &  1 All ER 1011, that it is contrary to the public interest for organs of government to have a right to sue for defamation, does not apply in Malaysia.
The Appeals were essentially an attempt to clarify whether, in light of Chong Chieng Jen, government officials too have the right to sue for defamation.
Amongst others, the majority of the Federal Court in the Appeals (2-1) were of the view that:
i. the Appellant brought the defamation action personally and not in his official capacity; and
ii. Chong Chieng Jen was irrelevant as it was about the right of the State Government to sue for defamation whereas the Appeals were about an individual’s right, albeit a public official, to sue for defamation.
Notwithstanding the above, the Federal Court allowed the appeal and opined that:
“… a public official must enjoy the same rights as other citizens and be allowed to sue for damages for defamation in any individual capacity whether in relation to personal or official matters. He need not avail himself to the provisions of the Government Proceedings Act 1956. Accordingly, the decision in the case cannot be sustained.” (emphasis mine)
The current position, as per the Appeals, is that government/public officials can bring an action for defamation in their individual capacity in relation to personal or official matters.
The Malaysian Chinese Association, had initiated a defamation suit against Mr. Lim Lip Eng (the Member of Parliament for Kepong) over the latter’s claims that the former had misused Government and public funds allocated for National Type Chinese Schools.
Mr. Lim applied to strike out the defamation suit but was unsuccessful.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr. Lim was once again unsuccessful.
Mr. Lim then sought leave to appeal to the Federal Court and obtained leave on the legal question whether a political party can maintain a suit for defamation in the light of the decisions in Goldsmith v Bhoyrul (1998) and Rajagopal v Jayalalitha (2006).
Recently, the Federal Court unanimously answered the leave question in the negative and allowed Mr. Lim Lip Eng’s appeal.
The legal position as it stands is that political parties cannot bring an action for defamation.
by Joshua Wu Kai-Ming | Dec 6, 2014 | Law, Politics
Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Razak, through his lawyers has issued a letter of demand to PKR’s Rafizi Ramli and DAP’s Tony Pua over a few things the outspoken duo have said in recent times
Our premier wants Tony Pua to publish a retraction and apologise within 14 days in two national newspapers, or face legal action for his speech recorded in the November 3 video: “Tony Pua: Najib is creating the biggest scandal ever in the history of Malaysia”
Failure by Rafizi and/or Tony Pua to act as per the letter of demand would most definitely result in legal action being initiated against them
Some netizens take this as a sign of cowardice on the part of Najib because it comes across as an act to scare off his detractors. I, however, think it is a good thing that Najib wants the courts to adjudicate what has been said by the two Pakatan Rakyat leaders regarding the reduction of fuel subsidies and the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) respectively
I say so because if the issue reaches the courts, evidence will be have to be submitted by both parties. Through that and the court’s ruling, the people can ascertain objectively who is actually correct/telling the truth.
Does the money saved from the reduction of petrol subsidies go into Najib or Rosmah’s pocket? We will most assuredly find out. Regarding 1MDB, is there any hanky-panky use of the people’s money? We will undoubtedly find out
If Mrs Donoghue did not sue the manufacturing company of the ginger beer after finding a decomposed snail in her drink we would not have the landmark case of Donoghue v Stevenson
In that case, Lord Atkin established the all important ‘neighbour principle’ and it revolutionised the tort of negligence as we know it today.
This shows us that case law is an important contributor to the development of the law as it ensures that the law stays relevant in light of changing social, economic and cultural conditions
Moving on, the freedom of speech does not include the right to defame a person. Therefore, if Rafizi has no evidence to support his claim that Najib or Rosmah would directly/indirectly benefit monetary wise from the reduction of fuel subsidies, he should be liable for defamation
In Tony Pua’s case, he gave some immensely mind boggling statistics. However, if he does not have any solid admissible evidence to back his allegations about 1MDB, he would have to fork out a lot of money to compensate Najib for the “tremendous stress and embarrassment” caused
If Najib wins his lawsuit(s) against Rafizi and/or Tony Pua, the enormous amount of damages usually awarded in defamation cases should act as a precedent to teach our leaders to speak only when they have proof to attest to their claim.
If our public figures do not learn that lesson, we’d have more and more Mashitah cases whereby the irresponsible person speaks unsubstantiatedly and then gets whacked left, right and centre (metaphorically) by the public
In conclusion, while Dr Mahathir is of the opinion that taking legal action for political slander is useless, i beg to differ for the aforementioned reasons. The way I see it, litigation over controversial issues would be beneficial for the common folk who ardently follow our nation’s politics. Developing a litigation culture is good to a certain extent
*Check this awesome article out at The Malaysian Insider, The Malay Mail Online, and Free Malaysia Today